The
rises of domestic violence and
extremism views are a serious and
growing national security threat
that requires focus on evolving
threats of radicalization, the role
of social media, opportunities to
improve information sharing,
effective engagement, operational
responses and building digital
resiliency. The focus should be on
efforts to counter extremism and
radicalization with a new policy
review on how to disrupt violent
extremist social media networks and
prevent radicalization.
Understanding
Violent Extremism and
Radicalization to Violence:
Violent extremism is a term
describing the beliefs and actions
of people who support or use
violence to achieve extreme
ideological, other or political
goals. Radicalization is a process
by which an individual or a group
gradually adopts extreme positions,
a belief system that justifies the
use of violence to advance their
cause or ideologies that are opposed
to the status quo and challenge
mainstream ideas.
Why and how groups get involved in
violent extremism?
Group dynamics and environment play
important roles in shaping
individual involvement and action in
violent extremism. Even for
individuals who seemingly operate
alone, their actions are often
shaped through their relationships
with groups, social media and
networks and their environment both
in-person and online. The processes
involved in group and social network
include:
-
Intra-group influences:
Groups can exert important
influences on their members. For
example, research has shown that
people in a group setting often
feel pressure to conform and
maintain group cohesiveness,
making them reluctant to
disagree with others in the
group. People also tend to
believe that unanimity exists
among group members; regardless
if that is true. Moreover, group
discussions can lead individuals
to become more entrenched in
their pre-existing views and
beliefs, and increase their
openness to make riskier
decisions;
-
Competition within groups and
networks:
Sometimes groups will compete
against each other, even though
they espouse the same ideology,
to demonstrate credibility or
superiority by engaging in
violence. Alternatively,
individuals can splinter off
from a group because the group
is unwilling to use violence,
therefore leaving a splinter
group united by their
willingness to use violence;
-
Isolation and separation:
Research has shown that fellow
group members are considered
more persuasive, while outsiders
tend to be viewed as having a
hidden agenda. This can
sometimes lead groups,
especially groups that
experience opposition from
mainstream society, to isolate
themselves, where they
increasingly rely on their
members for information,
confirmation, and justification.
Ignoring outside voices,
extremist groups can drift
further into extremism and
ultimately into violence;
-
History and experience:
Groups or social networks can
become inspired by the past in
their search for ways to address
current grievances. This is why
ideologically-driven violence is
frequently linked with specific
places and individuals or groups
that have experienced past
violence or collective trauma;
-
Perceiving a threat of
marginalization or fraud:
Groups sometimes resort to
violence when members believe
they are under threat. The
threat can be specific, such as
when groups feel attacked by
mainstream society, the
government of marginalization,
the media, or the police. The
threat can also be more diffuse,
such as when groups feel they
are losing their values and
traditions, or during periods of
economic hardship and high
unemployment, or at times of
large political and social
change like in the case of US
2020 election where about half
of all Republicans believed that
President Donald Trump
"rightfully won" the U.S.
election but that it was stolen
from him by widespread voter
fraud that favoured Democratic
President Joe Biden and Vice
President Kamala Harris,
according to a new Reuters/Ipsos
opinion poll.
When does Radicalization Occur?
Radicalization occurs when a person
or group takes on extreme ideas and
begins to think they should use
violence to support or advance their
ideas or beliefs. These beliefs can
fall along a wide spectrum of
ideologies, including political,
social, racial, radical and
religious ideologies. The threat of
radical terrorism is high with the
majority of attacks taking place in
conflict zones, such as Syria, Iraq,
Nigeria, Somalia and Afghanistan. In
the years 2015 - 2018, dozens of
religious terrorist attacks were
carried out in Europe, the Middle
East and Africa. Conflict zones
serve partly as a breeding ground
for radical Islamist terrorism, as
apparent from the success of the
terrorist organization ISIL in Syria
and Iraq, for example.
Radicalization to violence is not a
phenomenon that uniquely affects
individuals of any particular
background, culture or religion as
seen in the case of the US Capitol
attack on Jan 6, 2021. On January 6,
2021, rioters supporting United
States President Donald Trump's
attempts to overturn his defeat in
the 2020 presidential election
stormed the United States Capitol.
After breaching multiple police
perimeters, they vandalized,
ransacked and occupied parts of the
building for several hours. The
storming led to the evacuation and
lockdown of the Capitol building,
and it disrupted a joint session of
Congress assembled to count the
electoral votes and formalize Joe Biden's election victory as
President of the U.S. The rioters
gathered in support of Trump's false
claims that the 2020 election had
been "stolen" from him. Summoned by
Trump, thousands of supporters
gathered in Washington, D.C., on
January 5 and 6 to demand that Vice
President Mike Pence and Congress
reject Biden's victory. The rioters
quickly became extremely violent,
assaulting a police officer who
later died, erecting a gallows on
the Capitol grounds, assaulting the
press, and desiring to take hostage
and harm lawmakers such as House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Pence, the
latter for refusing to invalidate
Biden's victory, with a total of 5
deaths.
The socio-economic circumstances,
levels of education,
ethnic/religious affiliations,
experiences of marginalization or
perceived election fraud play a
major role in violent extremism.
Also, some factors like a call by a
disgruntled leader to violence can
influence an individual's path to
radicalization to violence. These
can be specific to the individual or
can be based on their immediate
surroundings, or society at large.
In all cases, however, the
justification for the use of
violence is tied to some form of
extremist ideology or belief system.
Anyone factor on its own is not
typically enough to motivate an
individual to commit violence.
Generally, numerous factors interact
to propel individuals towards
radicalization to violence. These
may include:
-
A call to violence by a
disgruntled leader:
For instance, President Trump
held a simultaneous rally with a
speech that incited a mob that broke
into the Capitol;
-
Social networks:
Close friends and family can
influence an individual's
interest in an extremist
ideology that calls for
violence. Online communities or
social media exert a similar
influence;
-
Grievances:
Some individuals become so
preoccupied with social
injustice, real or perceived
that they join an extremist
group that promises to challenge
it through violence. These
grievances can range from
feeling personally discriminated
against perceived injustices
occurring locally or abroad;
-
Vulnerabilities:
In some cases, individuals may
be seeking to escape from or
solve personal problems (e.g.
poor family relationships, debt,
lack of a job, idleness, etc.);
-
Sense of belonging:
Similar to joining criminal
gangs, joining violent extremist
groups or causes can make
individuals feel like they are
part of a group;
-
Inclination towards violence: Some
individuals are simply attracted
to violence, while others are
drawn to the perceived heroic
roles promised to those who join
violent extremist or terrorist
groups.
Whether
and how diverse influences
contribute to harmful behaviour in a
given case is also shaped by the
presence or absence of protective
factors. These include:
-
Positive influences of credible
friends, family members or
mentors;
-
Belief systems that reject
violence as a solution to
problems;
-
Other sources of purpose and
social belonging, such as
employment, school, sports or
cultural, religious and
traditional activities;
-
Trusted avenues for concerned
friends, family, front-line
practitioners and community
members to seek help in
understanding and addressing
worrisome signs;
-
Professionals who are trained to
assess risks and provide
tailored interventions.
Countering Radicalization:
Countering radicalization to
violence should be a key priority
for all governments’ efforts. This
work includes:
-
New policy guidance: including
the development of the National
Strategy on Countering
Radicalization to Violence;
-
Promoting coordination and
collaboration: with
a range of actors to respond to
local level realities and
prevent radicalization to
violence. These partnerships
include all levels of
government, communities,
community organizations,
front-line workers and
practitioners, academics, and
police, etc.;
-
Funding, planning and
coordinating research: to
better understand radicalization
to violence and how best to
counter it. Also, mobilizing
evidence to reach front-line
workers and practitioners who
are working to prevent
radicalization to violence;
-
Targeted programming:
through local Community Centre
to provide financial support to
initiatives that aim to prevent
radicalization to violence.
Given the international dimension of
the threat from violent extremism,
the local Community Centre should
work in close collaboration with key
strategic partners like in Africa:
AU, ECOWAS, and internationally like
the US, UK, the Group of Seven (G7),
the European Union and the Global
Coalition against terrorism, which
is a partnership of 79 countries
that are united in efforts to defeat
terrorism through multiple fronts,
including preventing the flow of
foreign terrorist fighters across
borders and countering the group's
communications.
Harmful Impacts of Radicalization:
As suggested by the different ways
in which individuals, groups and
social networks become involved in
violent extremism and terrorism,
there are various ways in which
these activities create harm to
individuals, families, communities
and society as a whole. These
include:
-
Physical, emotional and
psychological impact:
The most obvious harm is the
direct victimization of those
who experience and witness
attacks. Violent extremism can
also create fear and increase
people's sense of insecurity of
society as a whole;
-
Normalization of violent action
and rhetoric:
There is evidence that exposure
to some forms of extremist and
terrorist violence can lead to
its perpetuation;
-
Polarization:
A significant concern is that
the destructive actions of some
individuals or groups will
prompt stereotypes and
'reciprocal' radicalization by
opposing individuals or groups.
This dynamic can potentially
worsen larger-scale divisions
and grievances;
-
Reduction of trust:
Some studies on the impact of
terrorism find that terrorist
attacks are associated with
lower levels of trust in
national institutions and the
legal system.
Again,
there is also evidence about what
can protect individuals
and society against the harmful
impacts of extremist and terrorist
violence. These can include:
-
Effective, appropriate support
for victims of attacks in the
short, medium and long term;
-
Meaningful, non-violent avenues
to address grievances and
conflicts and to advocate for
social change;
-
Positive social values,
including mutual respect, social
engagement and sense of
belonging for all;
-
Ways to de-escalate, counter and
marginalize destructive
discourses in the media and
public sphere;
-
Well-functioning state, social
institutions and media platforms
and outlets that are viewed as
procedurally fair.
Building Digital Resilience &
Effective Engagement:
In today’s digital age, social media
or online activities can facilitate
the radicalization to violence
process or be used by those who have
already radicalized to violence to
further their cause, obtain recruits
and circulate information on how to
commit attacks. Preventing and
countering radicalization to
violence online is complex and
requires a multi-stakeholder
approach that includes national and
international engagement with
technology companies, academic
researchers and civil society. In
this regard, governments should
promote evidence-based efforts to
prevent and counter-radicalization
to violence online through support
for initiatives such as:
-
Digital literacy:
Guidelines can help people of
all ages develop critical
thinking skills and build
resilience to violent extremist
and terrorist content online.
Young people, in particular, can
learn how to interact
respectfully with others in the
online space; to understand
contexts of content they see,
and to create, engage with and
share online content in a
responsible, safe and secure
way.
-
Alternative narratives:
The best efforts to challenge
violent extremist and terrorist
narratives include alternative
points of view developed and
delivered by trusted and
credible sources. These
alternative narratives,
effective engagement may relate
to topics such as participation
in democratic processes; the
value and importance of
inclusion and diversity;
critical consumption of media;
or positive roles played by all
Good People.
Effective engagement with youths is
critical to challenging violent
extremist and terrorist use of the
internet and social media. Young
people nowadays understand the
online environment and how their
peers use new and emerging social
media platforms. In engaging and
driving sustainable political and
social discussion, the Government
can develop and transmit effective
alternative narratives that point to
the errors, myths and contradictions
in violent extremist and terrorist
messaging. Also, they can provide
pro-social influences for their
peers and can steer their energy
toward positive political and social
endeavours. The government must
indirectly prioritize work with the
youths; fund projects to provide a
better understanding of the risks
faced by youths in the online space,
and facilitate engagement between
youths and key partners, such as
technology companies, researchers
and academicians etc. Technology
companies control the use of their
platforms, have influence over their
users and the content they host, and
own data critical to understanding
how to counter violent extremists
and terrorist use of the internet.
Reliable Sharing Knowledge:
For the knowledge base to be useful,
best practices in countering
radicalization to violence must be
shared with the right people in the
right way. Especially for early
prevention and building resilience,
knowledge must reach many different
audiences: front-line workers, such
as health and social service
providers, teachers and other
professionals in the education
system, faith leaders, as well as
parents, traditional leaders,
friends and community
leaders/members, drug centers etc.,
who may be dealing directly with an
individual radicalizing to violence.
The knowledge must be useful and
resonate with their perspectives.
Some initiatives to counter
radicalization and in essence
countering terrorism call for
engaging specific populations like
the youths, or emphasizing the
importance of families - and women
in particular - as crucial for
prevention. Yet these populations
are often very diverse especially in
African settings, whereby segments
of these populations have very
different social, political and
ideological views from each other.
Countering radicalization to
violence is a relatively young field
compared to other areas of
prevention. Therefore, building a
knowledge base is a key priority for
any Government to ensure that
evidence-based work is used to guide
policies and the creation and
implementation of programs to
prevent and counter-radicalization.
While the evidence is crucial to
inform best practices, it is also
crucial to avoid the possible harms
of efforts aimed at countering
radicalization. Knowledge, based on
research, monitoring, measurement
and evaluation, is a safeguard that
can help prevent the potentially
harmful consequences of even the
best-intentioned programs. On the
one hand, failure to identify an
individual radicalizing is a missed
opportunity to intervene. On the
other hand, mistakenly identifying
an individual as radicalized can
harm their reputation, and risk
stigmatization from friends,
relatives, and entire communities.
Counter-Terrorism:
The main focus in counter-terrorism
is on prevention, which refers to
addressing underlying causes,
motivations and other factors that
may lead to violent radicalization
and ultimately even enlistment in
terrorist groups. A key element in
the prevention of terrorism is to
incorporate the prevention of
polarization and inequality in
society in policies and strategies.
Polarisation and social exclusion
increase a sense of alienation,
which in turn may breed violent
radicalization and terrorism. The
Strategy must be the combatting
means activity by the authorities to
detect and combat the terrorist
offences defined in the Criminal
Code as early as possible. Every
effort should be made to detect
terrorist offences, the escalation
of phenomena linked to terrorism and
terrorist activities employing
comprehensive
intelligence-gathering, analysis of
data and observations, investigative
measures, and cooperation among the
authorities both nationally and
internationally.
Pre-Emptive Neutralization:
Some countries see pre-emptive
attacks as a legitimate strategy.
This includes capturing, killing, or
disabling suspected terrorists
before they can mount an attack.
Israel, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and Russia have taken
this approach, while Western
European states generally do not.
Another major method of pre-emptive
neutralization is the interrogation
of known or suspected terrorists to
obtain information about specific
plots, targets, the identity of
other terrorists, whether or not the
interrogation subjects are guilty of
terrorist involvement. Sometimes
more extreme methods are used to
increase suggestibilities, such as
sleep deprivation, drugs or ‘waterboarding’.
Such methods may lead captives to
offer false information in an
attempt to stop the treatment, or
due to the confusion caused by it.
These methods are not tolerated by
European powers. In 1978 the
European Court of Human Rights ruled
in Ireland v. United Kingdom case
that such methods amounted to a
practice of inhuman and degrading
treatment and that such practices
were in breach of the European
Convention on Human Rights Article 3
(art. 3).
Non-Military Campaigns:
The human security paradigm outlines
a non-military approach that aims to
address the enduring underlying
inequalities which fuel terrorist
activity. Causal factors need to be
delineated and measures implemented
which allow equal access to
resources and sustainability for all
people. Such activities empower
citizens, providing 'freedom from
fear' and 'freedom from want'. This
can take many forms, including the
provision of clean drinking water,
education, and vaccination programs,
provision of food and shelter and
protection from violence, military
or otherwise. Successful human
security campaigns have been
characterized by the participation
of a diverse group of actors,
including governments, NGOs, and
citizens. Foreign Internal Defense
(FID) programs provide outside
expert assistance to a threatened
government. FID can involve both
non-military and military aspects of
counter-terrorism. A 2017 study
found that "governance and civil
society aid is effective in
dampening domestic terrorism, but
this effect is only present if the
recipient country is not
experiencing a civil conflict.
Military Campaigns:
Terrorism has often been used to
justify military intervention in
countries like Pakistan, Iraq and in
some African countries like Nigeria,
Somalia where terrorists are said to
be based. That was the primary
stated justification for the U.S.
invasion of Afghanistan (U.S.
Marines in Afghanistan). It was also
a stated justification for the
second Russian invasion of Chechnya.
Military intervention has not always
been successful in stopping or
preventing future terrorism, such as
during the Malayan Emergency, the
Mau Mau uprising, and most of the
campaigns against the IRA during the
Irish Civil War, the S-Plan, the
Border Campaign (IRA) and the
Troubles in Northern Ireland.
Although military action can
temporarily disrupt a terrorist
group's operations, it sometimes
does not end the threat completely.
Thus repression by the military in
itself, particularly if it is not
accompanied by other measures
usually leads to short term
victories, but tends to be
unsuccessful in the long run (e.g.,
the French doctrine described in
Roger Trinquier's book Modern War
used in Indochina and Algeria). It
is equally important to know the
root cause of terrorism.
What are the causes of Terrorism?
Terrorism is perhaps one of the most
challenging problems of our times.
For those who have not seen the
effects of terrorism firsthand, its
effects may have not hit home yet;
but one can say for sure that the
world is not safer today than it was
yesterday. It doesn't matter anymore
which part of the world one lives
in. The unfortunate reality is that
terrorism has gone global and every
world citizen is equally susceptible
and vulnerable. To solve terrorism,
governments must first understand
what causes it. In addressing the
issue of terrorism in the world, it
is vitally important to address the
Carnegie Commission indicators using
what is referred to as the Deep
Prevention method; and to look at
the concept of peace-making in
protracted social conflict, which is
an important part of an emerging
theory of international conflict,
taking into account peculiar local
situation, combining domestic-social
and international dimensions and
focusing at a hybrid level between
insurgency and purely domestic
rioting or unrest, which can
escalate into terrorism. This model
anticipates much of the
re-evaluation of international
relations thinking that has occurred
since the end of the Cold War. What
will make it possible to unlock
these intractable conflicts is
of-course, the application of human
needs theory through the
problem-solving approach. Needs
theory holds that deep-rooted
conflicts are caused by the denial
of one or more basic human needs,
such as rights, security, identity
and recognition, or simply a mode of
expression. The theory distinguishes
between interests and needs:
interests, being primarily about
material goods, can be traded,
bargained and negotiated; needs,
being non-material cannot be traded
or satisfied by power bargaining.
However, non-material human needs
are not scarce resources, like
territory, oil, minerals, and water
and are not necessarily in short
supply. With proper understanding,
conflicts based on unsatisfied needs
that may lead to terrorist acts can
be resolved, and thereby focus on
those that cannot be resolved, and
address them properly, timely and
pre-emptively.
The popular perceptions for the
causes of terrorism include:
Poverty & Addressing Socio-Economic
Drivers and Promoting Social
Inclusion:
One of the most popular explanations
is that poverty alone breeds
terrorism. This is arguably not true
at all. Poverty and despair play a
role in radicalization and so also
lack of social inclusion. When 80%
of people live with less than a
dollar a day, begging for food with
no opportunities for the future, no
justice, no education, no job, no
government support, those are easy
recruits for radical movements and
terrorism. At the same time, one can
find details of the relatively
well-off, rich or middle class,
well-educated extremists, who
carried out or planned to carry out
terrorist acts all across the world.
The connection between poverty and
terrorism has been exaggerated over
time. There are also many poor
places around the world where there
are no terrorists at all (parts of
South America, Africa, and Asia).
However, recent research on
radicalization among Africans and
Central Asian labour migrants in
Russia as well as other studies
conducted by UNDP in other regions
all point to the fact that recruits
often come from borderlands or
peripheral areas that have suffered
from marginalization. They all tend
to have lower levels of secular
education and low levels of
religious literacy. Employment is
often the most cited reason for
joining extreme groups. The main
reasons at the time of joining are
perceived marginalization,
employment, security, to belong to
something or to have something to
do, water, electricity and
education. They tend to have limited
confidence in institutions, little
trust in politicians and security
apparatus and believed that the
government has no compassion towards
them. Illegal and uneducated
migrants abroad face wider
vulnerabilities that are more easily
exploited. At the same time, it is
argued that the stigmatization and
securitization of labour migrants
can in turn lead to social exclusion
and foster grievances.
An example is where a reformed
society member, who has many years
of experience working on
radicalization in communities,
mentioned that she had never come
across a single case where religion
alone had been the motivation. Most
either had financial problems or had
been rejected and lacked love and
confidence, which they sought by
joining extremist groups. One
conclusion that can be drawn is
that, although poverty plays a role,
it is not about just poverty, but
the lack of dignity, marginalization
and social exclusion that pushes
people to join violent groups. From
such findings, it becomes clear that
unresolved grievances combine with
social and economic exclusion (lack
of social inclusion) enable easy
recruitment. Grievances (push
factors) are exploited by
extremists, who then lure others
with promises of job opportunities
and other pull factors. There has to
be a better understanding of the
tipping point when grievances over
horizontal inequalities become
conditions for violent extremism and
terrorism.
Undemocratic (Totalitarian)
Governments:
Some argue that non-democratic
governments breed conditions that
extremists can exploit to further
their agenda. This idea too is not
so correct. North Korea is
non-democratic and so is China and
one does not see either of them
breeding "global terrorists" who
plan attacks around the world.
Besides, it was also obvious that
the communist systems in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe were much
more effective in preventing these
kinds of attacks than the
democracies of West Europe.
According to James M. Lutz and
Brenda J. Lutz, their analysis did
not provide strong support for the
idea that democracies have been more
prone to terrorist violence, or at
least international terrorism. “The
conventional wisdom of such a
connection, however, cannot be
discounted. Globally, the presence
of democratic systems was at least
at times negatively associated with
more terrorism at marginal levels.
The regional analysis indicated that
in the Middle East the connection
was very much stronger indeed”.
One indirect indication of
democratic vulnerability to
terrorism is the general absence of
non-state terrorism in totalitarian
(undemocratic Government) societies.
These most repressive systems have
been relatively free of such
terrorist activity. Totalitarian
governments have advantages in
dealing with potential terrorist
groups. They do not have to worry
about collecting evidence for a
trial or presenting credible or
compelling evidence. They can also
use more extreme methods of
interrogation or even threaten
family members as a means of gaining
leverage with suspects. Undemocratic
regimes have also been willing to
track down dissidents abroad to
eliminate them. The security
services in Nazi Germany proved to
be quite capable of dealing with
opponents by using such techniques.
The KGB in the former Soviet Union
was also notoriously effective in
dealing with dissidents or presumed
dissidents, and outbreaks of
terrorism were noticeably absent in
the Soviet Union before its
collapse. Terrorist actions were
also few in numbers in Saddam
Hussein's Iraq under the Ba'ath
regime. By contrast, the break-up of
the Soviet Union and the end of the
Ba'athist regime in Iraq have been
accompanied by noticeable increases
in terrorist activity. However, the
absence of terrorism in totalitarian
societies does not mean that
democracies are uniquely vulnerable.
Weaker states of all types have
provided opportunities for
terrorism, including weaker
undemocratic states.
It has also been suggested that
political systems in transition may
be more vulnerable. When political
systems are in transition, police
and security forces are often in
disarray and control mechanisms are
weaker. The states formed after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the
current Iraqi government and Libya
qualify as weaker states compared to
their predecessors and also as
political systems currently in
transition or at least in transition
in the recent past. Societies in the
transition from a non-democratic
regime to a democratic government
may be particularly vulnerable since
the grip of the old security forces
on society is diminished while the
new freedoms provide opportunities
for violent dissidents. Democratic
regimes, by contrast, are assumed to
provide more tempting locations for
terrorist activities than
totalitarian states. Democracies are
by definition more open politically,
and some protections come with
respect for civil liberties.
Furthermore, restrictions on
surveillance, concerns for civil
liberties, and a free press and
investigations by the security
forces and police agencies are in
force. Weaker intelligence-gathering
capabilities mean that the ability
to pre-empt terrorist groups before
they strike is more limited.
Checkpoints, where identity papers
need to be presented, are unusual
and infrequent. Moreover,
democracies also have relatively
weaker control of their borders,
thereby providing opportunities for
in- and ex-filtration. Recent
debates about immigration policies
in the United States and Western
Europe reflect some of the concerns
that can exist with more open
borders (notwithstanding recent
practices in the US for dealing with
enemy combatants). Moreover, even
when terrorists are arrested, there
are usually limits to the length of
detention and clear limits on the
mechanisms that can be used in the
interrogation of suspects. In
democracies, suspects are generally
given fair trials and have the
opportunity of gaining an acquittal
if the evidence is insufficient or
poorly presented.
Alienated Intelligentsia:
This is believed to provide a good
explanation. Looking at some of the
high profile conflict areas around
the world and the individuals
involved, one can almost always see
that there is an intellectual class
that rules the hordes of the
fanatics. There is a brain behind
all the bombings, the kidnappings,
the terrorist acts, etc. And in most
cases, these are educated,
well-to-do people who have
everything in life but have a sense
of disaffection, alienation or
resentment against the establishment
of the system or simply greed. They
aren't happy with the way the world
is at present and want to do
something about it. These are the
most dangerous terrorists, far more
than any of the foot soldiers who
carry out the actual attack. These
are the brains that brainwash,
radicalize and pressure confused
young men and women; quite often
children as well. In the 1920s, a
bunch of different threads came
together and crystallized as the
Modern liberal intelligentsia which
replaced the Victorian mainstream,
then, intellectuals had witnessed a
society-wide crisis of authority and
became acutely aware of the
bifurcation between themselves and
the rest of society. The inevitable
pressure of industrial and
technological progress compelled
these realizations, now seemed
prosaic in its human origins,
relentless in its application, and
impervious in the independence of
any individual or collective
intention. It was a force that ran
on its own accord. Intellectuals
responded in two ways: First, a
large number gravitated toward
modernist beliefs that were
concerned, above all, with autonomy
and independence; second,
intellectuals redefined and
reconceptualized culture in
fundamentally new ways that allowed
them to style a new kind of cultural
politics that could potentially
allow them to shape and direct the
American response to change.
Russia in the 1860s was a place of
turmoil, a battleground of radical
political ideals where Populism and
nihilism, wielded by the radical
intelligentsia, clashed against the
status quo of Russian autocrats and
orthodoxy. It was in this period
that some historians argue that
modern terrorism was spawned.
Contrary to the previous age,
intelligentsia sought to wield the
bomb or gun rather than the pen in
opposition to the corruption they
saw in the Russian state.
Whenever the alienated
intelligentsia has a sense of
disaffection, alienation or
resentment against the establishment
of the system they will indirectly
perpetrate acts of terrorism and
then use each new incident of
terrorism as an excuse for
censorship, for repression, for
controlling what people are
permitted to say and hear and read
and write. They’ll say, “If there
had been more laws against
`extremists,’ against people who
don’t like the government, against
people who don’t think the way we
tell them to think, this wouldn’t
have happened.” They will try to
stampede a timid, frightened,
confused public into allowing the
government to take away even more of
their rights in return for the false
promise of more security.
Indoctrination or Radicalization:
What happens when you teach a kid
that X, Y, and Z are your enemies
and that they mean no good to your
people, that these other people are
the devil. When a cleric teaches his
pupils that someone is an infidel
(unbeliever) and that he has no
right to live, then this king of
indoctrination or radicalization is
bad for society. What one can expect
to get with this kind of tutoring is
a radical who can do anything. No
wonder then that these radicalized
individuals can do the worst
atrocities and yet justify them
based on religion or other extreme
views. Tackling this kind of
radicalization cannot be solved
through military solutions: it
requires measures to increase the
literacy of the population, creates
jobs and socially protects
populations to take them out of
social exclusion and isolation.
The majority of Islamic extremists
act under quasi-Islamic slogans,
specifically, that is why there is
the need to intensify religious
education. More work is needed to
intensify religious education and
work with religious leaders to
promote a peaceful and correct
understanding of Islam. Governments
must take several initiatives like
introducing courses on the history
of religions, Islam and the culture
of tolerance into school curriculum;
and expand Islamic studies in
universities and tertiary schools,
while efforts should be made to
develop counter-narratives for
students and increase engagement
with faith-based communities or
projects on inter - or
intra-religious dialogue.
Ethnicity and Injustice:
Some argue that ethnicity and
injustices (perceived or real) is
one of the root causes of terrorism.
Well, perhaps this is true as in the
case of the Rwandan genocide, but not
entirely in some instances. While
one may be brainwashed into thinking
that his people are being persecuted
when in fact they are not, the truth
is that millions are killed by their
same ethnic group and religion.
Saddam Hussein killed his people for
example and one can argue that he
perpetrated more atrocities than any
other foreign power, yet he was
viewed as a hero in his part of the
world by people of countries
surrounding Iraq. Why? This again
demonstrates the fact that
ethnicity, in its entirety has
nothing to do with it, although many
scholars have sought to explain why
countries with ethnically
heterogeneous populations experience
higher levels of political violence,
these studies have produced mixed
findings. Unlike most studies that
use ethnolinguistic
fractionalization indices to examine
this relationship, it is argued that
ethnic polarization is a more
appropriate measure to assess the
role of ethnicity as a causal factor
of domestic terrorism. The
hypotheses emphasized that high
ethnic polarization influences the
incidence of domestic terrorism,
particularly when intervening
economic factors are present. To
test the hypotheses, negative
binomial regression is used to model
data from the Global Terrorism
Dataset, World Bank, and the
Reynal-Querol (RQ) ethnic
polarization index of 116 countries
between 1970 and 2012. Findings show
that terrorism is more likely to
emerge in societies with high ethnic
polarization and economic malaise.
Charities that aren't Charities:
Information on terrorist financing
vulnerabilities to charities can be
found in the Assessment of Inherent
Risks of Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing all across world
democracies. Countries must work
with their international partners to
develop solutions to global issues
such as terrorist abuse of
charities. Although, there are
countless of these charities that
collect funds in the name of various
causes what they do is fund
terrorism, the activities of such
charities can be checked using the
Checklist below. As with any
business, the business of terrorism
needs funds and this is by far the
best way for fanatics to obtain
funds; others being collecting
kidnapping ransom money, drug money,
robbery, etc. Many countries support
these charities in the name of
religion and cultural ventures. They
have millions of dollars to spend
and they do so by funding these
charities and religious schools,
which use these funds to fund
terrorist activities and build more
schools of indoctrination and
radicalization.
Charities play a vital role in
achieving goals that Democracies
value highly, both at home and
abroad. Recognizing this, and to
encourage support to charitable
activity, the most Income Tax Act
gives special and significant tax
privileges to charities and donors.
To maintain public confidence in
these tax incentives, the Government
and charities need to protect the
charitable sector from abuse,
including the exploitation of
charitable resources to support
terrorism and other non-charitable
purposes and activities. The
following checklist is based on
international and domestic concerns,
experience, and guidance. It is not
meant to be a comprehensive guide,
but it will help registered
charities to focus on areas that
might expose them to the risk of
being abused by terrorists or other
criminals. One should not assume
that it could not happen!
Checklist:
-
Do
you know about the individuals
and entities associated with
terrorism, which are listed in
your country under the UN Act
and the Criminal Code? Are you
aware of the Criminal Code and
the Charities Registration
(Security Information) Act
provisions on financing and
supporting terrorism and the
consequences of breaching the
provisions?
-
Do
you have a good understanding of
the background and affiliations
of your board members,
employees, fundraisers, and
volunteers?
-
Have
you read the tax guidance about
keeping adequate books and
records, activities, engaging in
allowable activities, operating
outside your country, and
charities in the international
context?
-
Do
you have appropriate, sound,
internal financial and other
oversight and verification
controls, for example,
appropriate delegations and
separations of authority over
the collection, handling, and
depositing of cash and the
issuing of receipts?
-
Do
you transfer money using normal
banking mechanisms, wherever
possible? When it is not, do you
use reputable alternative
systems, and have strong
additional controls and audit
trails to protect your charity's
funds and show how and when they
were used?
-
Do
you know who uses your
facilities and for what purpose,
for example, your office or
meeting space, name, bank
account, credit cards, website,
computer system, telephone or
fax, what they are saying, and
what materials they are
distributing or leaving behind?
-
Do
you try to find out who else
might be supporting a person or
cause that you are endorsing in
public statements, and who uses
your name as a supporter?
-
Do
you know where your donations
and other support come from?
-
Do
you know who has ultimate
control over the project that
your charity's money and
resources are benefiting, and
what the money and resources are
used for, including after the
particular project is finished?
-
Do
you know your partners in
delivering the work you are
doing and their affiliations to
other organizations?
-
Do
you have clear written
agreements with
agents/contractors/other
partners, locally and abroad,
covering what activities will be
undertaken and how they will be
monitored and accounted for? Do
you check that the agreements
are being followed?
The use or threat of violence to
achieve a political aim, regardless
of the cause, cannot be reconciled
with the legal concept of charity.
Although these issues have come to
prominence since 9/11 and the more
recent terrorist attacks in Madrid,
London, and elsewhere, any links
between registered charities and
terrorist activity have never been
acceptable. The intentional
provision of support to terrorists
is a crime. Anyone who suspects
links to terrorism should report
them immediately to the proper
authority.
The perceived threat of
Marginalization, Religion and
Isolation:
Individuals or groups sometimes
resort to acts of violence when
members believe they are under
threat. The threat can be specific,
such as when groups feel attacked by
mainstream society, the government
of marginalization, the media, or
the police. The threat can also be
more diffuse, such as when groups
feel they are losing their religious
values and traditions, or during
periods of economic hardship and
high unemployment (joblessness) and
isolation, or at times of large
political and social change. The
simple conclusion to draw as to the
causes of terrorism today can be
attributed neither to the adherents
to any single ethnicity, religion,
poverty or social class but that a
significant number of the more
outrageous terrorist acts may be
attributed to a small number of
terrorists, who have an ulterior or
a political motive and use religion
or other reason as a mere tool to
justify their acts; and they are
entirely divorced from their
enclave: social class, religion,
culture or ethnic background who
distort and use it as a convenient
cover to try to legitimize their
actions in the popular minds. But
under sub-measures of the world
counter-terror, the surveillance
discourse serves to control and
regulate Muslims' perception of
terrorism and the undertone of
Western values and national security
narrative, which continue to
normalize and perpetuate anti-Muslim
sentiment and construct Muslims as
“suspect” communities at every
possible opportunity. This ensures
that anti-Muslim racism remains a
key feature of contemporary western
society, which is unfortunate. It
may be difficult, perhaps
impossible, to stop a determined
individual who wants to commit an
act of terrorism if they get through
every security checkpoint, but some
things can surely be done to
prevent, stop and limit the acts and
the spread of extremist violence and
radicalization of young people; and
divert their support.
How to Limit the Spread of Extremist
Terrorism
Keeping a Check on Extremist Clerics
& Build
Resilience:
These clerics are the most dangerous
of all extremists, the foot soldiers
who carry out the attacks and go
away (in the case of suicide
bombers). However, these clerics
(the brains) keep cultivating and
harvesting fertile and confused
minds; educated, illiterate, rich,
or poor, young ones, all are equally
affected by their vitriolic sermons
that call upon waging war on the
West. Countless young minds have
fallen prey to these clerics and the
ironic thing is that they do so
under the very noses of current
"democracies."
In building resilience to
recruitment, the government needs to
enhance the role of community
leaders, civil society groups,
religious leaders, and families to
build resilience against violent
extremism; increasing the level of
education and employment and
correlate them together; while
enhancing the role of local
government authorities and
increasing the effectiveness of
states to offer social intervention,
protection and opportunities. The
government must also recognize the
positive influence of religion and
supporting traditional-community
leaders play and development of
sport and education programs to
promote national values among young
people, promote small businesses and
entrepreneurship, organizing job
fairs etc., while providing support
to economic development and job
creation, livelihoods enhancement,
public service provisions, social
citizen engagement, good governance
and peacebuilding, rule of law,
etc. All these falls within the
sustainable development goals of the
UN and non-security social sectors.
Monitoring Hateful Content Online:
Monitoring hateful content online is
always difficult and even the most
advanced systems accidentally miss
some. Part of a country's online
monitoring should include using
Country-Wide Exchanges for online
connectivity and monitoring of
social media contents.
Online ‘media’ and propaganda
efforts now constitute a major
component of terrorist campaigns,
including for organizations like
ISIL and al-Qaeda, which both have
developed dedicated media teams.
Terrorists can exploit the Internet
in two fundamental ways:
-
Individuals can use social media
to support or facilitate
political violence. In this
sense the Internet aids the
perpetrators’ activities
offline;
-
Individuals can also use the
online environment to cause
damage directly to further their
interest, referred to as
‘cyber-terrorism’. The Internet
helps terrorists expand their
reach, increase their impact and
facilitate activities offline.
It facilitates five main areas:
-
Communication & networking;
-
Research, information
gathering and distribution;
-
Financing (fundraising,
financial transactions,
fraud);
-
Recruiting new members
(physical encounters are
crucial, but these are
enhanced by online networks)
and;
-
Distributing propaganda and
controlling information.
When it comes to responses, the
expert noted three main approaches
to combating terrorists’ use of the
Internet: 1) Taking down extremist
content – some countries and
organizations have established
dedicated units (internet exchanges)
for this purpose; 2) using the
Internet to disrupt terrorist
activities and monitor their
communication, and 3) using the web
to spread counter-narratives.
Regarding the development of
counter-narratives, the content of
delivery and audience is highly
important. The content could include
both/either positive components
(countering the appeal of extremist
messages with alternative sources of
belonging, significance, and
personal and collective achievement)
and/or negative ones (highlighting
inconsistencies of the extremist
messages, highlighting the
universally harmful outcome of
terrorists’ actions - in terms of
victims and political consequences;
highlight their internal divisions
and disputes etc.). Effective
narratives also need to take into
account the delivery of the message:
Coherent messages consistent with
actions have to be delivered by
credible actors, including former
extremists, who have an impact on
the audience. They need to be
delivered through multiple
platforms. They also need to target
their audiences carefully using
different sources. Effective
counter-narrative work has to start
with an understanding of the at-risk
audience, the reason for their
vulnerability and how they are
influenced before tailoring
messages.
And during terrorist attacks, the
big online platforms face
particularly significant challenges
but we should avoid scapegoating
them. All of them (Twitter, Facebook,
YouTube, Google, Snap chat, etc.)
are signed up to the European
Commission’s #NoPlace4Hate program.
They are committed to removing
illegal hateful content within 24
hours, a period which is likely to
come down to just one hour.
Four special measures are needed to
specifically target the short term
influx of hate:
-
Adjust the sensitivity of the
hate detection algorithms:
All
tools for hate detection have a
margin of error. The designers
have to decide how many false
negatives and false positives
they are happy with. False
negatives are bits of content
that are allowed online even
though they are hateful and
false positives are bits of
content that are blocked even
though they are non-hateful.
There is always a trade-off
between the two when
implementing any hate detection
system. The only way to truly
ensure that no hateful content
goes online is to ban all
content from being uploaded –
but this would be a mistake. Far
better to adjust the sensitivity
of the algorithms so that people
are allowed to share content but
platforms catch a lot more of
the hateful stuff;
-
Enable easier takedowns:
Hateful content that does get
onto the big platforms, such as
Twitter and Facebook, can be
flagged by users. It is then
sent for manual review by a
content moderator, who checks it
using predefined guidelines.
Content moderation is a
fundamentally difficult
business, and the platforms aim
to minimize inaccurate reviews.
Often this is by using the
“stick”: according to some
investigative journalists,
moderators working on behalf of
Facebook risk losing their jobs
unless they maintain high
moderation accuracy scores.
During attacks, platforms could
introduce special procedures so
that staff can quickly work
through content without fear of
low-performance evaluation. They
could also introduce temporary
quarantines so that content is
flagged for immediate removal
but then re-examined at a later
date;
-
Limit
the ability of users to share:
Sharing is a fundamental
part of social media, and
platforms actively encourage
sharing both on their sites
(which is crucial to their
business models) and between
them, as it means that none of
them miss out when anything goes
viral. But easy sharing also
brings with it risks: research
shows that extreme and hateful
content is imported from niche
far-right sites and dumped into
the mainstream where it can
quickly spread to large
audiences. And during attacks,
it means that anything which
gets past one platform’s hate
detection software can be
quickly shared across all of the
platforms. Platforms should
limit the number of times that
content can be shared within
their site and potentially ban
shares between sites. This
tactic has already been adopted
by WhatsApp, which now limits
the number of times content can
be shared to just five;
-
Create shared databases of
content:
All
of the big platforms have very
similar guidelines on what
constitutes “hate” and will be
trying to take down largely the
same content following attacks.
Creating a shared database of
hateful content would ensure
that content removed from one
site is automatically banned
from another. This would not
only avoid needless duplication
but enable the platforms to
quickly devote resources to
challenging content that is hard
to detect. Removing hateful
content should be seen as an
industry-wide effort and not a
problem each platform faces
individually. Shared databases
like this do also exist in a
limited way but efforts need to
be hugely stepped up and their
scope broadened. In the long
term, platforms need to keep
investing in content moderation
and developing advanced systems
that integrate human checks with
machine learning. But there is
also a pressing need for special
measures to handle the
short-term influx of hate
following terrorist attacks.
Stop the Flow of Terrorist Funds:
Stop the rich countries that fund
the construction of religious
schools without proper background
checks (as shown above in Charities
that aren't Charities Checklist).
Pressure them through diplomatic
channels to fund charities and
religious schools only after proper
verification and certification that
they aren't indulging in any radical
propaganda and brainwashing their
students to extreme views. Also,
improve banking laws at home as well
as in developing countries to ensure
that fanatics don't benefit from lax
regulations and circumvent the
system by getting funds to their
plans. Most importantly, put
safeguards in place to de-incentivize
kidnapping for ransom money, drug
money, robbery, banditry etc., to
fund terrorist acts.
Securing the Borders & Surveillance:
There are always people who want to
harm others for their selfish greed,
therefore stricter screening of
people who come into the country
must be taken into consideration;
and at various communities as well.
This doesn't mean one has to close
one's doors to everyone; however,
one should at least keep an eye out
for undesirable radicals who mean no
good.
With regards to the practice of
surveillance, excessive information
gathering, e.g. through untargeted
surveillance and excessive storing
of data in contravention of data
protection standards, may lead to
information overload and diverts
scarce resources away from core
tasks of counter-terrorism (CT)
investigations and CT policing. It
is a waste of financial resources as
there is no evidence of their
effectiveness. At the same time,
over-surveillance increases the risk
of people being unfairly targeted
and undermines general trust in the
states’ CT efforts. Lack of respect
for human rights also undermines
trust between states and may, as a
result, represent a serious obstacle
for information sharing between
countries as well as international
law enforcement cooperation in
countering terrorism. The
representative of UNHCR pointed out
the right of people to asylum. He
stressed that refugees are not the
source of terrorism but rather
victims as they were forced to leave
their home countries because of
terrorism. The influx of refugees is
a humanitarian issue and not a
political or security-related one.
The Solution of Pre-Emptive Strike,
Dialogue & Torture:
People who think that one can
negotiate peace with terrorists are
unfortunately living in a
make-believe world. Recognize that
terrorists come from widely
divergent backgrounds and are
motivated by a plethora of different
reasons.
Honestly, what can one negotiate
with terrorists? What are the
negotiating points here? What can be
offered to them and what would they
accept? Some terror groups, for
example, want to see a world that is
nothing like the one that is known.
Many of these "brains" behind the
most dangerous extremist groups want
just their utopian world governed by
their utopian laws. Some people just
don't like the idea of a
"pre-emptive strike." However, when
confronted with an irrational enemy
who sees no sense or knows not what
their aims are, other than blowing
up people because someone drilled
that into them, the only reasonable
solution is to take the war to them
and fight and defend them in a
pre-emptive way.
On the other way, every country
wants to get rid of this menace, of
terrorism, radicalization etc., so
if some individuals or groups who
were either brainwashed, recruited
or were about to be radicalized
suddenly realized that the direction
they were going was not good and
they wanted to repent, the
authorities could give them amnesty,
design adequate interventions and
put them into it. The interventions
should include some sort of
rehabilitation as a better option to
tackle down the menace, following
the ideology of dialogue, peace and
understanding. In this case, right
at the unset, it is therefore
important to understand individual
motivations for surrendering, as
well as gender roles to design
adequate interventions. Also, it is
much better to understand women’s
roles and applying a gender approach
to the prevention of violent
extremism.
Dialogue is essential because it
would look at why and how promoting
good governance, human rights (HR)
and rule of law could help prevent
grievances, which in turn could lead
to engagement with violent extremist
groups. In other words, violating
human rights while conducting
counter-terrorism (CT) could lead to
more insecurity. States should
protect everyone within their
jurisdiction against terrorist acts,
and they should do so in compliance
with international human rights law.
Anti-terrorism measures that fail to
respect human rights are
counter-productive, not least
because a lack of respect for human
rights constitutes in many ways a
condition conducive to terrorism. CT
measures that fail to respect HR
play into the hands of terrorists
and terrorist recruiters who seek to
undermine security, social cohesion
and human rights. At the same time,
human rights-based CT measures can
increase operational effectiveness.
This understanding is at the core of
the OSCE’s comprehensive concept of
security and it is enshrined in
pillar 4 of the UN Global CT
Strategy.
Another point to protect innocent
individuals is the prohibition of
torture and other ill-treatment
under international law, which is
absolute under all circumstances.
Not only does torture violate the
trust between communities and law
enforcement bodies, turning people
away from supporting states’ CT
efforts, it could also be
counter-productive. According to
senior US officials, for example,
the mistreatment of detainees in Abu
Ghraib prison was the single most
important motivating factor for
terrorists and foreign fighters to
travel to Iraq. Torture is also
ineffective in the long-term as
evidence received through torture
could be misleading and unreliable
because torture is known to produce
false confessions. As the OSCE has
remarked in its work with law
enforcement officers, for example,
counter-terrorism officers can
obtain more and better information
by using interview techniques that
respect the rights of suspects,
witnesses and other informants.
Going forward, every Government
should develop some sort of National
Strategy on Countering
Radicalization to Violence for its
country with the sole intention to
be a flexible framework to guide
prevention-based initiatives towards
countering extreme views,
radicalization to violence and
terrorism. In particular, the
strategy, to be adaptable to an
environment where the threat of
violent extremism is constantly
changing, as well as the means
through which the threat is
expressed. The strategy should also
aim to raise awareness of what is
currently known about radicalization
to violence, so practitioners,
front-line workers and stakeholders
in general to prevent it. Being
equipped with the latest information
and tools is crucial to implementing
effective prevention efforts.
Finally, the strategy must be for
continuous dialogue with the
stakeholders and aim to stimulate
discussion on this challenging
topic, to promote the kinds of
collaborations between the
Government and the people; and its
partners, to ensure that efforts to
counter radicalization to violence
and terrorism in the societies are
responsive to local realities. By
continuing to build those
connections, by not giving
sensational priority responses to
terrorism in the media, which in
some cases, generate substantial
unintended consequences.
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